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TIPS GIVEN TO NEVADA CASINO DEALERS BY CASI-
NO PATRONS ARE NONTAXABLE GIFTS, NOT
INCOME-Olk v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 1108 (D.
Nev. 1975).
INTRODUCTION
Each year millions of people are drawn to Nevada's gambling
tables. While the lucky gambler's winnings are clearly taxable
income,' the tax consequences are not so clear for the lucky
dealer, who has been given a tip or the winnings of a side
bet2 placed for him. Until recently, this money was consid-
ered income taxable to the dealer as compensation for services ren-
ered.8 The United States District Court for Nevada in 01k v.
United States4 upset this rule when it decided that tokes5 given to a
1. INT. Rsv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a); INTERNAL REVENUE SERvicE, YouR
FEDERAL INcomvm TAx 29 (1975). See Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228
(9th Cir. 1974); McClanahan v. United States, 292 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1961).
2. A side bet is a bet made for the dealer operating the game being
played. If the bet is a winning one, its proceeds go to the dealer for whom
it was made. See Lawrence E. Bevers, 26 T.C. 1218, 1219 (1956).
3. Lawrence E. Bevers, 26 T.C. 1218 (1956); INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954,
§ 61(a) (1); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a) (1) (1966).
4. 388 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Nev. 1975).
5. Tokes are a Nevada colloquialism for tips. This word was used by
the court in 01k to avoid the conclusion that the receipt of money by a
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dealer in a Nevada casino were not income because the dealer
offered no compensable services to the players. Finding no social
compulsion to give a toke to a dealer, the Ok court decided that
tokes were gifts because the gambler/donor was motivated by
"detached and disinterested generosity."
Classifying dealer's tokes as gifts creates problems which were
not specifically addressed in Ok. Since the owner of the money
which produces the gambling income should be taxed on the result-
ing gain7 or be able to deduct the resulting loss,8 a determination
of when the gift is complete is necessary to ascertain who owns
the side bet. If the side bet is a complete gift upon placing the
bet, the dealer is the owner of the money. Thus, he should have
taxable gambling income or a deductible gambling loss. If the
gift is incomplete until the bet is won, the gambler is the owner
of the money and he should be taxed on the gain or be able to
deduct the loss.
Olk v. United States
As a craps9 dealer in two Las Vegas casinos, Wendell Olk had
the job of collecting the dice after each roll, paying winning bets,
and collecting losing bets.10 In these casinos the dealers were for-
bidden to fraternize or carry on unnecessary conversations with the
patrons."- Any money given to the dealers by the gamblers, in-
cluding winnings from side bets, was pooled and divided equally
among the dealers at the end of the shift. The management of
the casinos either required the dealers to pool their tokes or en-
couraged them to do so.
12
Based on an audit which revealed some tips which were not
included in income, Olk was assessed almost $800.00 in additional
dealer automatically constituted taxable income within the meaning of the
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a). 388 F. Supp. at 1109.
6. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960), quoting Com-
missioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956).
7. See Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940). See also J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INcOviE TAxATION 442
(2d ed. 1973); 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL TAXATION § 18.02 (1974).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (d); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-10 (1960).
9. Craps is a gambling game played with two dice in which the
"shooter" or roller attempts to achieve certain "points" or total showing on
the dice. For a more detailed explanation see Drzazga, Gambling and the
Law-Dice, 43 J. CRnw. L.C. & P.S. 405, 406-07 (1952).
10. Wendell Olk's other duties included calling the roll of the dice, mak-
ing change for the players, advising his supervisor when a player wanted
a drink, and answering basic questions about the game. 388 F. Supp. at
1109.
11. See note 27 infra.
12. 388 F. Supp. at 1110.
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taxes. Olk paid the deficiency and filed suit when his refund claim
was denied claiming that the money he received was a gift and
not taxable income.'3 This argument is not new; it has been raised
several times by waiters, cab drivers, and others in the service
industry.14 However, each time this argument has been raised,
the courts have concluded that the money received was not a gift
but was gross income as compensation for services rendered.
Dispelling the Tips-Are-Income Rationale
In Roberts v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 the Ninth
Circuit held that tips were income because they were compensation
for services. The taxpayer, a cab driver, failed to include the tips
he received from passengers in his gross income. The court consid-
ered two previous Tax Court decisions 16 and the general nature
of tipping 7 when it held that tips were income because "the giv-
ing of a tip is tied to the service, without which the occasion would
not have arisen."'8
The Tax Court in Lawrence E. Bevers,'9 a case involving facts
similar to Ok, applied the Roberts rationale to casino dealers. Tips
13. Id. at 1109.
14. See Miller v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964) (bookkeeper
and headwaiter); Andrews v. United States, 295 F.2d 819 (Ct. Cl. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 829 (1962) (cab driver); United States v. Burdick,
214 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955) (executive
clerk in the New Jersey State Senate); Lawrence E. Bevers, 26 T.C. 1218
(1956) (dealer).
15. 176 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1949). Although Roberts is the leading case
standing for the proposition that tips are includable in gross income as com-
pensation for personal services, it has long been the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice's position that tips were includable in gross income. See IRS News Re-
lease No. IR-284, quoted in 1959 CCH FED. TAx RPTR. 6428, which states
that since the regulations have included tips as part of gross income since
1918, such an interpretation has acquired the force and effect of law.
16. Nazzareno D. Cesanelli, 8 T.C. 776 (1947) (failure to report tips war-
rants the imposition of a penalty); F.L. Bateman, 34 B.T.A. 351 (1936) (tips
held to be a deductible expense).
17. Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 118 F.2d 324, 326 (5th Cir.
1941), affd, 315 U.S. 386 (1942), states that tips in the main are additional
compensation.
18. Roberts v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 176 F.2d 221, 224
(9th Cir. 1949).
[A] tip is connected directly with the service and its quality. He
who tips expresses . . . his gratification with the service by com-
pensating the servant over and above the regular remuneration for
the service. Id.
19. 26 T.C. 1218 (1956).
received by dealers were held to be an incident of the services per-
formed for the gamblers.20 The court reasoned that these tips
were
obtained as a direct result of his employment... [and] came to
him in his capacity of dealer, therefore we can only conclude that
it [the tips] represented gains derived from his labor as a dealer.21
Examining this line of authority, the court in Olk concluded
that the Tax Court in Bevers "misapplied the principles enunciated
in Roberts . . . [because it] failed to take into account the unique-
ness of a dealer's activities."22  The Olk court distinguished the
dealer's situation when it stated that most Tax Court decisions con-
cerning tips were based on the general nature of tipping.28 In con-
trast, the dealer's job was unique and the tips he received should
not be treated the same as tips received by others in different call-
ings.2
4
The court in Olk distinguished basic services and personalized
services in deciding that tokes were not income. While basic ser-
vices are rendered to the employer and offer only incidental bene-
fit to the customer,2 5 personalized services, which the employee
can vary in impact and manner of performance, are rendered
directly by the employee to the customer.2 6 The dealer renders
only a basic service because he is forbidden by the casino manage-
ment from rendering personalized services27 and because the
patron's "satisfaction with a dealer's service is not dictated by the
quality of the service itself, which does not vary, but by that
20. The services to which Bevers' tips were said to be an incident of in-
cluded dealing cards, spinning the roulette wheel, and paying winning
wagers. Id. at 1220.
21. Id. at 1221.
22. 388 F. Supp. at 1111.




27. The Bevers and Olk courts, although reaching different conclusions
of law, both made a factual determination that dealers were forbidden from
rendering special or personal services to the casino patrons:
Fraternization and unnecessary conversation between the dealers
and the patrons were forbidden by the management. The dealers
were not permitted to advise the patrons of advantageous bets, all
contact between them being reduced to an absolute minimum.
Lawrence E. Bevers, 26 T.C. 1218, 1219 (1956).
If he attempts to render special service to a patron, a dealer is sub-
ject to immediate termination. He is forbidden to engage in the
personable conduct which others rely on to obtain or increase the
amount of a tip. He does not furnish a personal service, but merely
carries out the duties of his employment. Olk v. United States, 388
F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (D. Nev. 1975).
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phenomenon known as 'luck.' "28 This decision was based on a
factual analysis of the dealer's relation to the patrons.
29
The outcome might have been different had the Olk court
considered whether variations in basic services could cause a player
to toke his dealer. A dealer could possibly vary the speed and
friendliness 0 of his service within the management's guidelines.
However, despite the friendliness of the dealer, it would seem
unlikely that a losing player would toke a friendly dealer. Even
so, losing players sometimes give tokes to dealers but generally in
hopes their luck will change.81
Birth of the Tokes-Are-Gifts Rationale
Since the Ok court held that tokes were not income, the ques-
tion became whether tokes should be classified as gifts.3 2 The
Roberts court rejected the gift classification because "[f]rom the
very beginning of the practice [of tipping], it was evident that ...
it lacked the essential element of a gift,-namely, the free bestowing
of a gratuity without consideration."33 Thus, under the Roberts
rationale a tip was not a gift because it was usually given out of
social compulsion, not disinterested generosity. The Olk court
applied the Roberts rationale but came to a different result because
dealers cannot "benefit from the 'social compulsion-tip' as can
others." 34 This decision was based on testimony which established
28. 388 F. Supp. at 1112.
29. It is important to note that the evidence did not show that the deal-
ers were undercompensated. They were
paid a salary which they felt was fair and adequate for the func-
tions they were to perform .... This is not a situation where the
evidence justifies the inference that management used tokes as a
camouflaged compensation and thus paid dealers lower wages than
they otherwise would have had to pay. Id. at 1112-13.
The possibility of undercompensation must have been very small, as the
Government did not even raise the point in its brief. Id. at 1113.
30. For example, a dealer could explain the rules in a friendly way or
speed up the play when a gambler was on a lucky streak.
31. This conclusion is based on a telephone interview with a Las Vegas
pit boss, a casino employee charged with direct supervision of dealers, con-
ducted on October 4, 1975.
32. The court in Olk mentioned in a footnote that an inquiry would have
been pursued into other possible Internal Revenue Code classifications had
tokes not ultimately fallen into the gift classification. 388 F. Supp. at 1112
n.3.
33. 176 F.2d at 223.
34. 388 F. Supp. at 1112.
that only five to ten percent of the gamblers give tokes to dealers.
The lack of peer pressure, combined with management forbidding
the dealers from displaying any disapproval of a nontipper, elim-
inated any social compulsion to tip a dealer.35
Central to the gift classification of tokes is the intent of the
player.3 6 The toke must be a product of "detached and disinter-
ested generosity [arising] out of affection, respect, admiration,
charity or like impulses. '37  When the transaction is equivocal,
"inquiry into motive and purpose . . . serves to expose the true
nature of the transaction.138  Testimony in the Ok case indicated
there were a number of reasons for toking a dealer. Some players
were motivated by sudden impulses of generosity to share their
good fortune with dealers; other players gave money to dealers un-
der the superstitious belief that "the recipient is 'lucky' for them"8 9
and the toke would enhance the player's luck. The court found
this irrational behavior "not an unusual occurrence in gambling
casinos of Nevada."40  Viewing this behavior, the court held that
these spontaneous and superstitious impulses were forms of dona-
tive intent necessary to classify tokes as gifts.41
The gift classification can also be supported by an objective
analysis of the anticipated benefit casino patrons generally expect.
If they anticipate a benefit "beyond the satisfaction which flows
from the performance of a generous act. .... ,,42 then their money
given to dealers cannot be classified as a gift unless their expecta-
tion of economic benefit is not "within the power of the recipient
to bestow directly or indirectly. . . ,,43 Since any economic bene-
35. Employees in other service industries can display disapproval of a
nontipper by scowling or voicing verbal disapproval. Olk v. United States,
388 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (D. Nev. 1975).
36. The most critical consideration in determining whether a gift has
been made is the transferor's intention. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363
U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960).
37. Id., quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956), and
Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952).
38. Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1009 (1971). See also 1 MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL TAXATION § 7.13,
at 48-49 (1974):
If all of the essential elements of a valid gift are present the mo-
tives that prompted the donor to make the gift are immaterial....
Nevertheless, where there is doubt as to the nature of the transac-
tion, the court may consider motive or purpose in determining its
true intent.
39. 388 F. Supp. at 1113.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Coliman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1975), quoting
Harold DeJong, 36 T.C. 896, 899 (1961), affd, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
43. Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1975), quoting
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fit to the patron is dependent on luck,44 outside the dealer's con-
trol,45 tokes must logically result from the player's gratitude for
the luck the dealer has brought him or hopefully is going to bring
him.40 Therefore, since the dealer is unable to give anything in
return for the toke, the gift classification is logically supportable.
SIDE-BET PRoBLElvrs
Because of the setback in Olk, the Internal Revenue Service can
be expected to litigate the taxability of side bets. Since most
players make side bets for the dealer rather than toking him
directly47 and since winnings from these side bets have been classi-
fied as gifts to the dealer,48 most of the tax revenue lost because
of the Olk decision will be from these side bets. There are two
alternate methods of recouping some of this lost revenue but they
are not without problems. One method would be to reclassify side-
bet winnings from gifts to the dealer's gambling income. This
would be possible if the side bet is considered complete when it
is made since the dealer would be taking a gambling risk with his
own money. The other possibility is to tax the player on the side-
bet winnings. This would be possible if the side bet is considered
complete when the side bet has won because it would be the player's
property that generated the income. To consider these alternate
sources of income, the point in time when the gift becomes legally
complete must first be considered. The answer to this threshold
question will determine the treatment of side-bet winnings and
losses.
Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1009 (1971).
44. If the game was "21" or baccarat, economic benefit to the patron
could also depend to some extent on his skill in playing the odds.
45. This assumes there will be no collusion between the player and the
dealer. For example, the only way a dealer would be able to control the
player's luck would be to help the player switch to loaded dice in a craps
game or communicate the value of the cards in the dealer's hand in a "21"
game. See, e.g., NEWSWEmK Sept. 17, 1973, at 83.
46. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
47. Telephone interview with a casino pit boss, supra note 31.
48. The 01k court combined side-bet winnings and money given directly
to the dealers and called them tokes. 388 F. Supp. at 1110. The court went
on to discuss tokes as if they were given directly to the dealer. No effort
was made to differentiate the two forms of tokes. This eliminated any dis-
cussion of the possibility that side bets themselves could be gifts and the
side-bet winnings could be gambling income to the dealer.
When Is the Gift Complete?
Although the Internal Revenue Code excludes guts from gross
income,49 it does not define them. Thus, the local law of the situs
of the gift must be consulted for the requisite elements. 0  In
Nevada, a gift is valid if dominion and control over the property
have been transferred to the donee, with the intent to transfer title
absolutely without consideration. 51 Assuming, as established in
01k, that a gambler has the requisite donative intent, the question
becomes whether dominion and control over the property have been
effectively transferred. Considering side bets on any dealer-op-
erated game in the casino, there are two transfers of money that
could complete the side-bet gift. The first transfer occurs when
the gambler places his side bet on the table.52 The second takes
place after the side bet has won and the dealer collects the
winnings.
At the first exchange, the gambler places the side bet on the
appropriate area of the table and informs the dealer that the side
bet is for him. This action indicates the player's intent to make
a gift53 and shows delivery of the money. Since a bet cannot be
revoked after the play has begun, 54 the gift would be complete
only if the trier of fact found that the player had sufficiently relin-
quished dominion and control by placing the bet. The gift would
also be complete if the trier of fact found a sufficient relinquish-
ment of control coupled with an intent to create a trust.5  The
49. IN. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a).
50. 34 Am. Jum., Federal Taxation § 5040 (2d ed. 1975). See also Blair
v. Rosseter, 33 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1929); 1 MARTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATioN § 7.12 (1974).
51. Simpson v. Harris, 21 Nev. 353, 362, 31 P. 1009, 1011 (1893).
52. For example, each gambler seated around a "21" table has a space
in front of him where his money is placed to indicate to the dealer that
the gambler wants to have cards dealt to him.
53. The Olk court did not specifically consider when the player had
donative intent in relation to a side-bet form of toke. See text accompany-
ing note 55 infra.
54. Telephone interview with a casino pit boss, supra note 31.
55. It is interesting to note that if the gift were ineffective because of
the player's failure to relinquish control over the bet, the transaction might
be upheld as a gift of a beneficial interest by urging that it is a complete
and irrevocable declaration of a trust. See A. Scor, ABR DGEMENT OF THE
LAw OF TRUSTS 80 (1960). The gambler would be the settlor and trustee,
the dealer would be the beneficiary, and the side-bet money would be the
res. If the requisite intent to create a trust could be established, the dealer
would have a beneficial interest in the side-bet money. If the player has
not retained excessive controls such as the power to revoke, the beneficial
owner of the res should bear the tax burden of the income it generates.
See also Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL
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gift, however, probably occurs at a later time. The second transfer
that could complete the gift takes place after the side bet wins.
If the player wins, the dealer pays off the side bet with the casino's
money. The dealer will then take the winnings and the original bet
off the table and place them in a box where they are accumu-
lated.56
There are three factors which show the gift is not complete until
the side bet wins. First, in the games of "21" and baccarat, the
gambler can exercise some control over the side bet by playing the
cards dealt to the side bet.57 Second, although a gambler play-
ing any of the games usually allows the dealer to pick up the
winnings when the play is over, 58 he has the power to instruct
the dealer to leave the side-bet winnings on the table as another
side bet.59 Finally, the dealer cannot pick up the side bet before
the play is over.60 Therefore, it seems that the gift is not complete
until at least the side-bet has won and the dealer is allowed to
collect the side bet winnings.
61
Because the gift is probably complete at winning, the player
should be taxed on the resulting gambling income because it was
his property that generated the winnings. 62 However, a factual de-
termination that the player relinquished control when the bet was
placed leads to a different result; the dealer should be taxed on
the winnings as gambling income.
INco m TAxATON 442 (2d ed. 1973). Thus, under either the trust or gift
theory, the dealer will be taxed on the side-bet winnings only if the player
has relinquished excessive control over the side bet.
56. Lawrence E. Bevers, 26 T.C. 1218, 1219 (1956).
57. Depending on his skill in playing the odds, a gambler has only lim-
ited control over winning. But in regard to losing, he has ultimate control
as he can always take another card which would put him over 21.
58. Telephone interview with a casino pit boss, supra note 31.
59. Lawrence E. Bevers, 26 T.C. 1218, 1219 (1956).
60. Dealers are prohibited by house rules from touching bets until the
play is over. It is also doubtful that a gambler would allow the dealer
to pick up the side bet without the gambler being able to play the hand.
Telephone interview with a Las Vegas pit boss, supra note 31.
61. The Bevers court, without explanation, stated that side-bet money
remained the property of the player until he allowed the dealer to take
it. 26 T.C. at 1219. The Olk decision implies the same result because the
intention to make a gift was only discussed in reference to the money the
dealer received from side bets. This implies that the gift intention occurred
only after the side bet had won. 388 F. Supp. at 1108. See note 52 supra.
62. See authorities cited note 7 supra.
A similar analysis is applicable to side-bet losses. Since the gift
is probably incomplete until the side bet has won, the player should
be able to deduct the loss of the side bet.63  As with side-bet
winnings, a factual determination that the gift is complete when
placed will allow the dealer a deduction for the side-bet loss. This
result would not be affected by the dealers' practice of pooling their
tokes because the total amount of the side-bet loss could be split
among all the dealers who are eligible for a share of the tokes.0 4
CONCLUSION
When reviewing 01c, the Ninth Circuit Court will be hard pressed
to avoid the 01k holding that dealers offer no compensable services
to gamblers. Attempting to furnish luck is definitely not a com-
pensable service. If the question becomes whether the gambler had
the necessary donative intent, the 01k decision must be upheld
because intent is a question of fact and the trial judge's decision
that tokes are given spontaneously by superstitious gamblers is not
clearly erroneous. However, the problem of how to treat side bets
was not directly examined and is certainly open to limitation in
the future.
The 01k court implicitly held that the gift is complete when the
side bet has won because it concluded that side-bet winnings, not
merely the bet itself, were gifts to the dealer. Any lost revenue
caused by the 01k decision can be recovered by requiring gamblers
to include side-bet winnings in their gross income. Even though
side-bet winnings are now gifts rather than compensation for serv-
ices, gamblers should still be able to deduct side-bet losses because
they are incurred in wagering transactions. 05
In addition to its immediate effect, the 01k decision may also have
a national impact. For example, parimutual ticket clerks may
benefit from 01k because good luck may prompt the purchaser of
these tickets to give one to his seller. Likewise, card parlor dealers
63. Gambling losses may be deducted up to the amount of gambling in-
come. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(d); Treas. Reg. 1.165-10 (1960). From
a practical standpoint, it would be much easier for the player to keep track
of side-bet losses than the dealer.
64. The Internal Revenue Service has allowed tokes that are earned by
the dealer and pooled and split by the employer to be taxed to the dealer
on his pro rata share rather than on a per person basis. See Lawrence E.
Bevers, 26 T.C. 1218, 1219 (1956). This conflicts with Lucas v. Earl, 281
U.S. 111 (1930), holding that the person who performs personal services
should be taxed on the income generated therefrom. This seems to imply
that there is no difference in the type of service dealers can offer.
65. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (d); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-10 (1960).
[VOL. 13: 439, 1976] Recent Developments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
should benefit from Olk. Certainly, other members of the service
industry are likely to challenge the income classification of their
tips.00
PHm AURBACH
CALIFORNIA "CONSENTING ADULTS" LAW:
THE SEX ACT IN PERSPECTIVE
A continuing debate has raged over the propriety of state
regulation of the private sexual conduct of consenting adults.' It
has been questioned whether the state should attempt to regulate
sexual behavior by imposing criminal sanctions.2 The California
66. Sidney Weidenfeld recently initiated a class action suit against the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue on behalf of Gifts For Cabbies, an or-
ganization representing about 300 cab drivers. Hoping to benefit from the
Olk decision, he alleged that drivers' tips are gifts. Las Vegas Review Jour-
nal, Sept. 27, 1975, at 3, col. 3.
1. Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Em-
pirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County,
13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 643, 648 (1966). For an illustration of the continuing
debate, compare G. MuELLER, LEGAL REGuLATiON OF SXAL CONDUCT (1961)
and Williams, The Proper Scope and Function of the Criminal Law, 74 L.Q.
REV. 76 (1958) with P. DEVLI, TnE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1968).
2. Numerous recent articles have recommended that private consensual
sexual behavior no longer be a criminal offense. See E. ScHUR, ClmuVs
WITHouT VIcTims 67-119 (1965); Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the
Proposed New Maryland Criminal Code: Should Private Consenting Adult
Hvnosexual Behavior be Excluded?, 30 MD. L. REV. 91 (1970); Hefner, The
Legal Enforcement of Morality, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 199 (1968); Project,
supra note 1; Comment, Criminal Law-Consensual Homosexual Behavior
-The Need for Legislative Reform, 57 Ky. L.J. 591 (1969); Comment,
Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273 (1971); Com-
ment, Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults-Why Not?, 2 PAC. L.J. 206
(1971); Comment, Oral Corpulation: A Constitutional Curtain Must be
Drawn, 11 SAw DIEGO L. REV. 523 (1974); Comment, Sodomy Statutes-A
Need for Change, 13 S. DAKOTA L. REv. 384 (1968).
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